479 U.S. at 68-69. In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that the EEOC guideline calling for employers to offer the accommodation that least disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities (without undue hardship) is different from requiring an “employer to simply accept any different favored by the worker in need of undue hardship.” See id. 2008) (analyzing reasonableness of proposed accommodation based mostly in part on information usually thought of as part of undue hardship analysis); Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1030-33 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that though not all Seventh-day Adventists are vegetarian, a person adherent’s real religious perception in such a dietary apply warrants constitutional safety under the first Amendment); see Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1993) (employee’s request for depart to take part in his wife’s religious conversion ceremony was sufficient to place employer on notice that this was pursuant to a religious observe or belief; an employer need have “only sufficient information about an employee’s religious needs to permit the employer to grasp the existence of a conflict between the employee’s religious practices and the employer’s job requirements”).
1993) (explaining that the query whether or not an accommodation is cheap requires a “more searching inquiry” if an employee, “in order to accommodate his religious practices, had to just accept a reduction in pay or some other lack of benefits”); Am. 520, 531 (1993) (holding that though animal sacrifice could appear “abhorrent” to some, Santeria is religious in nature and is protected by the primary Amendment); Thomas v. Rev. Bd. 707, 714 (1981) (ruling that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, constant, or comprehensible to others with a purpose to advantage First Amendment protection”); United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1995) (relying on First Amendment jurisprudence to observe in Religious Freedom Restoration Act case that “one man’s religion will at all times be one other man’s heresy”). 1977) (observing that the plaintiff “did little to acquaint Chrysler along with his religion and its potential impression upon his capability to perform his job”); see also Redmond, 574 F.2d at 902 (noting that “an worker who is disinterested in informing his employer of his religious wants ‘may forego the right to have his beliefs accommodated by his employer’” (quotation omitted)).
1997) (holding that employee who seeks accommodation need not belong to an established church, “but a one who seeks to obtain a privileged legal status by advantage of his religion cannot preclude inquiry designed to find out whether he has in actual fact a religion”); Chrysler Corp. Notwithstanding the completely different authorized requirements for figuring out when a failure to accommodate poses an undue hardship below Title VII and the ADA, see supra notes 5 and 6, courts have endorsed a cooperative information-sharing process between employer and employee for religious accommodation requests, much like the “interactive process” used for disability accommodation requests below the ADA. Ensuring this process is stress-free is crucial to our service and assist. 5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001) (holding that employer was not liable for disciplining an employee for tardiness the place the worker failed – till after his discharge – to clarify that tardiness was as a result of he attended a prayer service), aff’d on other grounds, 318 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.
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